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INTRODUCTION 
Now this is not the end.  It is not even the beginning of the end. 
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. 
– Winston Churchill, 1942 
 
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.  I would like to thank 
Dean Janet Levit for her support for the research and writing of this Article.  Randy Coyne 
offered guidance and invaluable suggestions on earlier drafts.  Lorena Rivas-Tiemann and 
Lindsey Earls provided outstanding research and support on this Article, and Melanie 
Nelson and Courtney Selby provided important research assistance.  Cyndee Jones 
provided technical support.  All errors, of course, are mine alone. 
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t 11:08 p.m. on September 21, 2011, amidst national and 
international media attention, the state of Georgia killed Troy 
Davis, despite evidence suggesting that he was not guilty.1  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, while delaying Mr. Davis’s execution for a few 
hours, failed to intervene.  Unfortunately, Mr. Davis’s execution was 
not unique or even unusual.  Many are on death row or have gone to 
their deaths despite questionable evidence,2 prosecutorial 
misconduct,3 jury selection problems,4 incompetent defense counsel,5 
defense counsel burdened by conflicts of interest,6 as well as other 
procedural and due process defects.7  However, as reflected in the 
media and public reaction to Mr. Davis’s death, his execution occurs 
at an important juncture in the macabre world of capital punishment.  
Mr. Davis’s death symbolizes the end of the beginning of America’s 
failed experiment with the modern death penalty. 
The United States has been executing people for thirty-five years 
under the modern death penalty regime that killed Mr. Davis.  For 
much of that time, politicians and a majority of the American public 
appeared to embrace capital punishment with great enthusiasm.  
Slowly over the past ten years, however, America’s relationship with 
capital punishment has frayed, and our conversation about the death 
 
1 Kim Severson, Davis Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1. 
2 For example, see the case of Todd Willingham executed in Texas in 2004.  See David 
Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute the Wrong Man, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 
42. 
3 In 1998, Florida executed Willie Darden whose capital trial was rife with prosecutorial 
misconduct.  See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
4 Florida killed Johnny Witt in 1995.  The Supreme Court eased the standards for death 
qualifying a jury in a death penalty case and thus rejected Witt’s claim that the trial court 
committed constitutional error in dismissing certain jurors for cause based on their views 
about the death penalty.  See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
5 Missouri executed Alan Bannister in 1997.  Bannister’s lawyer rarely spoke with his 
client prior to trial, presented no defense to the intentional murder charge, and in 
sentencing presented no mitigating evidence.  STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: 
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 307–10  (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). 
6 Virginia killed Walter Mickens even though defense counsel failed to disclose to 
Mickens that counsel previously represented the murder victim.  See Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162 (2002). 
7 Georgia killed Warren McCleskey in 1991.  By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court 
affirmed McClesky’s conviction and death sentence despite evidence of racial bias in the 
death sentencing process of Georgia.  Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in 
McCleskey, later stated that if he could go back, he would change his vote in that case.  
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–52 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 
1994). 
A
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penalty has shifted.8  Doubts about the accuracy of convictions and 
death sentences, worries about procedural safeguards, and questions 
about the high cost of the death penalty have emerged.  This 
observation about the current state of the death penalty debate does 
not mean that the death penalty is near its end; it is not, at least not 
yet.  But what does appear to be happening is that the country’s initial 
infatuation with the death penalty is over and a new phase of the 
modern death penalty has begun. 
This shift not only may foreshadow the increased probability of 
abolition of the death penalty at least in some parts of the United 
States, but also it may play an important role in the development of 
the Eighth Amendment and the protection of human rights.  The 
protection of human rights and human dignity is a dynamic process 
engaging both democratic and judicial policy and decision-making 
processes.  This interplay is particularly interesting in light of the 
recent actions of the legislatures of New Jersey,9 New Mexico,10 and 
Illinois,11 which have now legislatively abolished the death penalty, 
as well as the New York legislature’s decision not to revise its death 
penalty statute after it was struck down by the New York Court of 
Appeals.12 
In the parlance of the Eighth Amendment, the determination of 
human dignity and the corresponding constitutional constraints on 
government to protect that dignity depends on whether there exists an 
evolving standard of decency reflecting the progress of a maturing 
society that would limit or outright ban a particular form of 
punishment such as torture or capital punishment under certain 
circumstances.13  This long-standing, well-accepted principle reflects 
 
8 It is of interest to note that a recent poll in California indicated that while sixty-eight 
percent of voters support the death penalty, voters prefer life without the possibility of 
parole to the death penalty by forty-eight percent to forty percent.  Marisa Lagos, Field 
Poll: Less Voter Support of Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2011, at C2. 
9 New Jersey abolished the death penalty in 2007.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 
(West 2007).  For a discussion of the development of abolition in New Jersey see infra 
Part IV.B. 
10 New Mexico abolished the death penalty in 2009.  See infra Part IV.A. 
11 Illinois abolished the death penalty in 2011.  See infra Part IV.C. 
12 See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
13 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (prohibiting the imposition of life 
without the possibility of parole on non-homicide juvenile offenders); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for 
ordinary offenders whose actions do not result in death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (prohibiting mandatory death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
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an understanding that the Eighth Amendment is not static but rather 
evolves to protect and reflect current human rights norms.14  The 
progression toward greater human rights protection under the Eighth 
Amendment does not often come about simply because of some top-
down decision-making process; rather, it usually arises out of the 
efforts of a few individuals, lawyers, legislators, and organizations 
committed to protecting human rights and dignity. 
This Article examines the evolution of the death penalty in the 
United States, focusing on the modern death penalty regime that the 
U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned in 1976.  As Mr. Davis’s execution 
demonstrates, the conversation around the death penalty has 
undergone a marked change in the last decade.  Since 2007, a few 
states have abolished the death penalty, signaling an important turning 
point in America’s modern experiment with capital punishment.  This 
Article traces these developments and the effect they may have on the 
future of the U.S. death penalty and the protection the Eighth 
Amendment affords. 
 
(1972) (prohibiting the death penalty in a system allowing unfettered jury sentencing 
discretion); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (“Difficulty would attend the 
effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides 
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that 
punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all 
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the 
Constitution.”). 
14 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (“To determine whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to “‘the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 
(asserting that whether the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “has been 
fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment 
was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that ‘currently prevail’”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“[W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments 
which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society’”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The Court recognized 
in that case that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not 
static.  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (citation omitted)); Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“This was the motive of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
C]lause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we cannot 
think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts’, or to prevent only an 
exact repetition of history.”).  It is worth noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas have 
questioned this application of the Eighth Amendment, although their position is a minority 
view and inconsistent with doctrine spanning more than one hundred years.  See, e.g., 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2044–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
607–08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
ENTZEROTH 3/19/2012  1:59 PM 
2012] The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American 801 
Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century 
I 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Long before the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, societies, including those in the Americas, punished offenders 
by killing them.  Indeed, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law,” reflecting a recognition of 
government’s power to take a human life.  Yet, the consideration and 
application of the death penalty, even in early American history, 
proved more complicated than simply recognizing and accepting that 
governments could execute an individual as punishment.15 
Even in the late 1700s, Americans debated the morality, 
appropriateness, and efficacy of the death penalty.16  Of particular 
note during this time period was On Crimes and Punishments and 
Other Writings by Cesare Beccaria.17  Influenced by the philosophical 
writings of the day,18 Beccaria, the son of an Italian nobleman, 
advocated abolition of capital punishment and torture and proposed 
graduated punishment for crimes.19  At least in part as a result of 
Beccaria’s writings, combined with the Enlightenment thinking that 
influenced the framers of the Constitution, some prominent early 
Americans, including Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, James Madison, 
and Thomas Jefferson,20 advocated limiting the death penalty to the 
most serious offenses.21  Others, most notably Benjamin Rush, 
 
15 For a discussion on the history of the death penalty in the United States and the 
meaning and development of Eighth Amendment protections, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
16 GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, at 492–94 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); Furman, 408 U.S. at 296–97 (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
17 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1764). 
18 WOOD, supra note 16, at 492–94. 
19 See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s 
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 196–203 
(2009). 
20 See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776–1865, at 53–54 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1989); WOOD, supra note 16, at 492.  State constitutions appeared to embrace the idea of 
more enlightened and proportional punishment, even though the constitutions did not 
outright prohibit capital punishment altogether. 
21 See MASUR, supra note 20, at 52–53; WOOD, supra note 16, at 493. 
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strongly advocated for abolition of the death penalty altogether.22  
Republican ideals of the early United States, as well as Christian 
tenets, served as a key impetus to the early death penalty debate and 
opposition to capital punishment.23 
Perhaps reflecting this aspect of early American thinking, Alexis 
de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s, 
In no country is criminal justice administered with more mildness 
than in the United States.  While the English seem disposed 
carefully to retain the bloody traces of the Middle Ages in their 
penal legislation, the Americans have almost expunged capital 
punishment from their codes.  North America is, I think, the only 
country upon earth in which the life of no one citizen has been 
taken for a political offense in the course of the last fifty years.24 
Tocqueville found, however, that these principles of criminal justice 
and compassion did not extend to slaves; to the contrary, enslaved 
people in the United States continued to be subjected to “horrid 
sufferings” and “barbarous punishments.”25  The brutal legacy of 
slavery and the pattern of differential and harsher treatment for 
African Americans continued well into the twentieth, and indeed the 
twenty-first, century. 
As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, American 
jurisdictions began rejecting the British mandatory death penalty 
practice and started moving toward a procedure that provided for 
judge or jury sentencing discretion.26  At least in part, the motivation 
for such sentencing discretion arose out of the concern that a harsh 
mandatory death penalty could cause juries to render a not guilty 
verdict as the only way to spare the life of a guilty defendant.27  
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states 
increasingly adopted discretionary capital sentencing systems.28 
An abolition movement to end capital punishment emerged in the 
1840s,29 and a few states abolished capital punishment during this 
 
22 MASUR, supra note 20, at 62–70. 
23 WOOD, supra note 16. 
24 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 176–77 (Henry Reeve trans., 
4th ed. 1840). 
25 Id. at 177. 
26 BANNER, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 214–15. 
29 MASUR, supra note 20, at 117–24. 
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time period.  Michigan abolished the death penalty in 1847,30 Rhode 
Island and Wisconsin abolished the death penalty in the 1850s,31 and 
Iowa and Maine abolished the death penalty in the 1870s.32  In the 
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of certain methods of execution.33  While the Court 
upheld executions by firing squad34 and the electric chair,35 it 
observed, “[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all 
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the 
Eighth Amendment] to the Constitution.”36 
In the early twentieth century, fifteen states greatly restricted or 
abolished the death penalty, although seven of these states reinstated 
the death penalty within a few years.37  During the 1950s and 1960s, a 
movement toward abolition reasserted itself as public support for 
capital punishment declined and actual executions decreased.  A few 
states abolished or greatly restricted capital punishment,38 and by the 
late 1960s, those jurisdictions that still retained the death penalty had 
essentially stopped executions.  A number of observers assumed that 
the United States would just quietly phase out capital punishment.39 
 
30 BANNER, supra note 5, at 134.  The most recent state to abolish the death penalty is 
Illinois, which abolished the death penalty in 2011. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 220.  Notably, Iowa reinstated the death penalty in 1878 and then abolished it 
again in 1965. 
33 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).  It is 
worth noting that at the time these cases were decided the Eighth Amendment had not 
been incorporated to the states. 
34 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132–33. 
35 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449. 
36 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136. 
37 BANNER, supra note 5, at 222–23. 
38 Id. at 221–23.  New Mexico, New York, and Vermont partially abolished the death 
penalty, and Iowa and Oregon abolished capital punishment altogether. 
39 See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia: Not an End, but a Beginning, in DEATH 
PENALTY STORIES 95, 124 (John H. Blume & Jordan Steiker eds., 2009); Lyn Entzeroth, 
The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely 
Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 537–38 
(2011). 
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II 
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY REGIME 
It was against this background that the Supreme Court in 1972, in 
Furman v. Georgia,40 examined whether the death penalty violated 
the Eighth Amendment.  Since states had discarded mandatory 
sentences,41 the death penalty in place in the early 1970s allowed 
juries complete or almost complete discretion to decide whether to 
sentence the defendant to life or death.  In Furman, the Supreme 
Court ruled that this discretionary death penalty system was too 
arbitrary, too capricious, and too unpredictable in its application; the 
Court ruled that the system gave juries too much unrestricted and 
unguided discretion to decide whether to allow the defendant to live 
or die.42  As a result, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, concluded 
that allowing unfettered discretion in imposing the death penalty 
violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.43  Notably, the 
Court did not find that the death penalty constituted a per se violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.44 
Issued as a per curiam opinion with each Justice writing separately, 
Furman provides insight into the complicated and differing rationales 
the majority relied upon in striking down the death penalty in 1972.  
Some of the Justices, particularly Justices Douglas and Marshall, 
found that the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the death penalty 
was further tainted or exacerbated by racism and poverty.45  Justice 
Stewart opined, 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as 
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously 
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in 
fact been imposed.46 
Further, Justice White observed, 
I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a 
conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts 
 
40 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
41 BANNER, supra note 5, at 214. 
42 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. at 240–57, 314–74. 
46 Id. at 309–10 (footnotes omitted). 
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and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state 
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized 
penalty.  That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is 
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes 
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.  
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority 
primarily in juries––a decision largely motivated by the desire to 
mitigate the harshness of the law and to bring community judgment 
to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or innocence––has so 
effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within the 
confines of the statutes now before us has for all practical purposes 
run its course.47 
Furman rendered all death sentences across the country void and 
struck down as unconstitutional all existing capital punishment 
statutes.  Even with states’ waning use of the death penalty, Furman 
displayed sweeping use of federal judicial power over the sovereign 
interests and prerogatives of states.48  Yet, if the statutes violated the 
Eighth Amendment, if states imposed the death penalty in an arbitrary 
or discriminatory manner, then it seems the basic and fundamental 
duty of the Court to strike down such statutes.49 
Notwithstanding Justice White’s prediction that the death penalty 
had “run its course,”50 shortly after Furman a number of state 
legislatures revised their death penalty laws to address the objections 
expressed by the Furman Court.  Many of these states used the Model 
Penal Code, a framework that the American Law Institute (ALI) 
recently abandoned as unworkable, as a guide to rewrite their death 
penalty statutes.51  In the 1960s, section 210.5 of the Model Penal 
 
47 Id. at 313. 
48 Indeed one of the concerns of the dissenters in Furman was the sweeping use of 
federal judicial power and the interference with state sovereign interests.  Id. at 375–470. 
49 This concept is as fundamental as judicial review under Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
50 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313. 
51 The ALI drafts the Model Penal Code as well as other model statutes.  The ALI sets 
forth the following summary of its work and mission: 
The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the 
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise 
improve the law. The Institute (made up of 4000 lawyers, judges, and law 
professors of the highest qualifications) drafts, discusses, revises, and publishes 
Restatements of the Law, model statutes, and principles of law that are 
enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal 
scholarship and education. ALI has long been influential internationally and, in 
recent years, more of its work has become international in scope. 
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Code set out a death penalty sentencing statute that arguably created a 
less arbitrary capital punishment system that included a separate 
sentencing hearing before a jury or judge.52  Under this system, the 
fact finder had to find the existence of an aggravating factor to make 
the defendant eligible for the death penalty; only if the fact finder 
found an aggravating factor could he consider the imposition of death.  
In deciding whether to ultimately sentence an offender to death, the 
fact finder also could consider mitigating factors warranting leniency.  
While some post-Furman statutes used this formula or some variation 
of it, other states experimented with alternative procedures 
purportedly designed to address the concerns of Furman, including 
mandatory death penalty systems.  In all, thirty-five states and the 
federal government enacted revised death penalty statutes.53 
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 
constitutionality of the revised death penalty statutes in five states: 
Georgia,54 Florida,55 Texas,56 Louisiana,57 and North Carolina.58  
The Court found the death penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and 
Texas constitutional,59 but struck down as unconstitutional the 
mandatory death penalty systems in Louisiana and North Carolina.60  
In Furman, Justice White stated, 
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously 
cruel in the dictionary sense.  But the penalty has not been 
considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense 
because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to 
serve.  At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these 
purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition 
in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment.  It is 
my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless 
and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to 
 
AM. LAW INST., ALI OVERVIEW, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about 
.overview (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
52 In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court recognized a constitutional 
requirement for jury sentencing in capital cases at least with respect to determining the 
existence of aggravating factors that qualify a defendant for the death penalty. 
53 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., PART I: HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#reinst (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
54 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
55 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
56 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
57 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
58 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
59 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262. 
60 Roberts, 428 U.S. 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280. 
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any discernible social or public purposes.  A penalty with such 
negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel 
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.61 
The Furman Court left unresolved the ultimate question of whether 
the death penalty is per se a violation of the Eighth Amendment.62 
The statutes before the Court in Gregg v. Georgia63 forced the 
Court to tackle this issue.  In a plurality opinion authored by Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, the Court recognized the long history of 
capital punishment in the United States64 as well as the legislative 
response to Furman.65  The Court further expressed the belief that the 
death penalty could deter certain offenses66 and/or serve as 
appropriate retribution for the offender’s crime.67  Because the Court 
accepted the view that the death penalty advanced the legitimate penal 
goals of retribution and/or deterrence, the Court found that the death 
penalty itself did not offend the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.68  This finding opened the 
door to the modern death penalty system by allowing states the 
freedom to experiment with different death penalty processes, 
provided that those processes did not otherwise violate the 
Constitution. 
The Court then turned to the revised death penalty systems to 
determine whether the new procedures established by the states were 
constitutional.  In Furman, the Court found that the old sentencing 
systems, which allowed unguided jury discretion in imposing death 
sentences, created an arbitrary, capricious, random process that could 
not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Louisiana69 and North 
Carolina70 responded to that constitutional concern by establishing a 
mandatory death penalty system.  The Court held, however, that while 
the death penalty system in Furman violated the Constitution because 
the system allowed too much discretion, the mandatory death penalty 
 
61 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972). 
62 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168–69. 
63 428 U.S. 153. 
64 Id. at 169–79. 
65 Id. at 179–81. 
66 Id. at 183, 186–87. 
67 Id. at 183–86. 
68 Id. at 187. 
69 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
70 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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systems of Louisiana and North Carolina violated Constitution 
because those systems allowed no discretion.71  In an oft-quoted part 
of its decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court stated, 
This conclusion [that mandatory death sentences are 
unconstitutional] rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of 
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, 
however long.  Death, in its finality, differs more from life 
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only 
a year or two.  Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case.72 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that while the jury could not have 
unfettered discretion to choose life or death, the jury had to have 
some discretion to impose a sentence less than death in a capital case 
to assure that death was the appropriate punishment as to that 
particular defendant and his or her crime. 
The Court, however, upheld the capital punishment systems of 
Georgia,73 Florida,74 and Texas.75  While these systems allowed, to 
varying degrees, some jury discretion, the systems also arguably 
provided juries guidance in the imposition of the death penalty.  
These systems set up processes whereby a jury had to find the 
existence of certain aggravating factors in order to qualify a case as 
egregious enough that the death penalty might be an appropriate 
sentence.76  Moreover, the systems provided the jury discretion to 
impose a sentence of less than death usually based upon consideration 
of mitigating factors that would warrant leniency.77 
 
71 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331–36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302–03. 
72 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 
73 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. 
74 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
75 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
76 See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.  Of note, Texas 
had the jury answer questions about the defendant’s future dangerousness and the nature of 
the crime to narrow the class of offenders.  In his dissent in Roberts, Justice White found 
the Louisiana mandatory death penalty statute constitutionally indistinguishable from the 
Texas statute approved by the Court in Jurek.  Roberts, 428 U.S. at 359–60 (White, J., 
dissenting).  In subsequent years, the Supreme Court found constitutional concerns with 
the Texas death penalty system as well as the ability of a defendant to present mitigating 
evidence and the jury’s ability to give effect to that evidence.  See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 
543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 429 U.S. 302 (1989). 
77 See Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. 
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These cases––Furman in 1972 and Gregg and the four companion 
cases from 1976––form the constitutional framework of the modern 
death penalty system in the United States.  In essence, to the extent 
that the death penalty carries out the legitimate goals of retribution 
and deterrence, it is not per se unconstitutional.78  Further, the Court 
permits states to experiment with different death penalty processes.  
The Court tolerates states’ experimentation with the death penalty, 
provided that states (1) give juries some criteria––usually in the form 
of aggravating factors––to determine whether the defendant is eligible 
for the death penalty, and (2) allow juries the opportunity to consider 
mitigating evidence and to perform individualized sentencing to 
impose a sentence less than death, if warranted. 
It is worth observing that there was a change in personnel in the 
four years between Furman and Gregg––Justice John Paul Stevens 
replaced Justice William O. Douglas.  Notably, Justice Douglas voted 
to strike down the death penalty statutes in Furman whereas Justice 
Stevens voted to uphold the death penalty in Gregg.79  It is unlikely, 
however, that this simple change in personnel alone accounts for the 
upholding of the new death penalty statutes.  Indeed, only two 
Justices––Justices Marshall and Brennan––would have struck down 
all of the revised death penalty statutes in 1976.  Justices Stewart and 
White, who joined the majority in Furman, voted to uphold the death 
penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and Texas. 
Perhaps the new systems were appreciably better and adequately 
eliminated arbitrariness and randomness in the death penalty process.  
Whether the systems were better or not, however, was not readily 
apparent in 1976.  The new death penalty statutes were an experiment 
to see whether, in practice, these systems could provide a rational and 
constitutional method of allowing the death penalty to be exacted on 
the worst of the worst.  By a number of accounts, the experiment has 
failed.  By 2009, the ALI, which drafted the Model Penal Code death 
penalty provision that served as the basis for many of the modern 
death penalty statutes, forcefully disavowed its model death penalty 
 
78 Interestingly, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who both voted to uphold the death 
penalty systems in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, subsequently questioned or wholly 
abandoned America’s experiment with death.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71–87 
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
79 But see Justice Stevens’s more recent discussion of the modern death penalty.  Baze, 
553 U.S. at 71–87 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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statute.80  In 2008, Justice Stevens, one of the authors of the plurality 
opinion in Gregg, observed in a concurring opinion, 
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in 
Furman on his extensive exposure to countless cases for which 
death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on my own experience 
in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty 
represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only 
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.  
A penalty with such negligible returns to the State [is] patently 
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth 
Amendment.”81 
Likewise, Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Furman and voted to 
uphold the death penalty in 1976, concluded in 1994: 
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death 
penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or 
not at all, . . . and, despite the effort of the States and courts to 
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting 
challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, 
discrimination, caprice, and mistake.  This is not to say that the 
problems with the death penalty today are identical to those that 
were present 20 years ago.  Rather, the problems that were pursued 
down one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have 
come to the surface somewhere else, just as virulent and pernicious 
as they were in their original form.  Experience has taught us that 
the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and 
discrimination from the administration of death . . . can never be 
achieved without compromising an equally essential component of 
fundamental fairness––individualized sentencing.82 
It is possible also that the Court’s constitutional sanctioning of the 
new statutes reflected the Court’s willingness and desire to protect 
states’ prerogatives in the structure of their criminal justice systems.  
Yet, a majority of the Court struck down mandatory death penalty 
statutes that a number of the states enacted in reaction to Furman.  
Thus, the decisions in Woodson and Roberts reflect the recognition 
that the Court asserts constitutional norms even at the expense of state 
sovereign interests.83 
 
80 See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
81 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, 
J., concurring)). 
82 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(citations omitted). 
83 Certainly this observation is true in a number of contexts outside of the death penalty.  
For a contemporary example, see, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
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While there are important legal and constitutional distinctions 
between the statutes at issue in Furman and the statutes at issue in 
Gregg, changes and developments in the law do not happen in a 
vacuum, and many factors influence court decisions and judicial 
development of the law.  In this regard it is important to recognize the 
legislative and public backlash to Furman that occurred across the 
country.84  Although some Justices thought that Furman would end 
capital punishment in the United States, thirty-five state legislatures 
made clear their decisions to retain the death penalty as a sentencing 
option. 
Moreover, during this period of time, the United States experienced 
a rather dramatic shift in social views and policy on imprisonment 
and punishment generally.  According to some scholars, from the 
1920s to 1970s, the dominant, albeit not always consistent, view of 
prison and criminal justice was a rehabilitation model.85  But in the 
1970s this view changed, and changed rather dramatically.86  By the 
mid-1970s, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the rehabilitation 
model of prisons and criminal justice and increased academic 
criticism about the efficacy of the rehabilitation model of prisons.87  
At the same time, crime rates rose and there were mounting public 
concerns about crime, social unrest, and the dramatic social change at 
play in the country during this period.88  By the end of the 1970s, the 
goals of rehabilitation were no longer the primary purpose of 
 
84 A number of articles have discussed the backlash to Furman, including Amanda 
Frost, Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757 (2010); Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2009); Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46–55 (2007); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an 
Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117 (2010). 
85 Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 
92–98 (2008). 
86 Id. at 98–101. 
87 Id. 
88 For a general history of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States see MARK 
KURLANSKY, 1968: THE YEAR THAT ROCKED THE WORLD (Ballantine Books 2004); 
JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1996); James T. Patterson, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM 
WATERGATE TO BUSH V. GORE (2005); see also Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great 
American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and 
Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489, 493–95 (2010) (book review); Ric 
Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 843, 850–51 (2010). 
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incarceration; rather, arguably more punitive or retributive goals 
emerged as the dominant purposes of prisons and incarceration.89 
Some commentators have speculated that, in part, the shift from 
Furman to Gregg reflects the Court’s reaction to the political and 
social backlash seen in the wake of the Furman decision.90  Likewise, 
the decision may mirror the changing political climate of the mid-
1970s, in particular the changing climate regarding prisons and 
punishment in general.  Further, this shift may indicate the Court’s 
concern over the appropriateness of the Court’s depriving states of the 
ability to experiment with death penalty schemes.  Regardless of the 
various motivations and justifications behind Gregg and its 
companion cases, these cases ushered in the modern death penalty in 
the United States. 
III 
AFTERMATH OF GREGG 
After Gregg, the country seemed to engage in a full-throttled 
acceleration of capital punishment and executions.  In 1999 alone, 
states executed ninety-eight condemned prisoners,91 and the country 
experienced one of the highest rates of executions in the twentieth 
century.92  In 2009, the United States ranked fourth in the world in the 
number of people executed, exceeded only by China, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia.93  Support for the death penalty in the last decades of the 
twentieth century emerged as a “can’t lose” political tool.94  During 
 
89 Haney, supra note 85, at 98–101. 
90 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 84; Hills, supra note 84; Lain, supra note 84, at 46–55. 
91 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
92 BANNER, supra note 5, at 303. 
93 AMNESTY INT’L, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death    
-penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2009 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
94 See Cathleen Burnett, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 191, 194 (2003) (“Support for the death penalty became part of 
conventional political wisdom while the voices for abolition were rendered impotent.  
Since Michael Dukakis’s defeat in 1988, attributed in part of his opposition to the death 
penalty, presidential candidates of both major political parties have all unequivocally 
supported the death penalty.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will, 
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 775, 791–92 n.81 (2010) (observing that during the 1980s, 
politicians successfully campaigned on platforms of more executions faster); William W. 
Wilkins, The Legal, Political, and Social Implications of the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 793, 803 (2007) (“To put it briefly, the death penalty is a political minefield.  In 
many states, including South Carolina, most political analysts agree that it is virtually 
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his first run for the presidency, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton 
oversaw the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally disabled man 
on Arkansas’s death row.95  This stance on execution contrasted 
sharply with the stance of 1988 Democratic presidential candidate 
Michael Dukasis, whom pundits derided and the public punished for 
his opposition to the death penalty.96  The execution of Rector 
demonstrated that Clinton, a Democrat, was not “soft on crime” or 
soft on the death penalty.97 
This political backlash against those who opposed, or even 
expressed reservations about, the death penalty extended to the 
judicial branches of state and federal governments.98  In a number of 
states, both trial and appellate judges are elected to their positions or 
subject to retention ballots.  This electoral process raises the specter 
of politicization of the judicial branch.99  In 1996, Tennessee 
Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost her seat on that state’s high 
court primarily because of a concurring vote in a death penalty 
case.100  Likewise, Chief Justice Rose Bird and two associate justices 
lost their seats on the California Supreme Court because of opinions 
critical of capital punishment.101 
 
impossible to be a successful candidate for statewide public office without being in favor 
of capital punishment, lest one be painted as ‘soft on crime’ by an opponent.”). 
95 Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 
317–18 (2008) (“Determined not to repeat the mistake of the preceding Democratic 
nominee for President, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, of opposing the death 
penalty, Clinton suspended campaigning on the eve of the 1992 New Hampshire 
Democratic primary to return to Arkansas to preside over an execution.  The condemned 
man was ‘a brain-damaged, African-American’ who had saved part of his last meal 
‘thinking that he was going to come back and eat it after the execution.’”). 
96 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 36–37 (2007); Leland 
Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the “Down Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in 
Presidential Campaigns, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 313 (2009); see also 
Alan Rogers, The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 
515, 530 (2008). 
97 Smith, supra note 95, at 318. 
98 See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? 
Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998). 
99 Id. at 845. 
100 See Kenneth J. Aulet, It’s Not Who Hires You but Who Can Fire You: The Case 
Against Retention Elections, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 589, 606 (2011); Paul D. 
Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience and 
the Activism of the Supreme Court, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2011). 
101 See id. 
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But the dawning of the twenty-first century began an important 
shift in America’s experiment with the modern death penalty.  
Evidence suggests increasing acceptance of and appreciation for 
Justice Stevens’s observation that 
current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the 
United States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part 
of our law are the product of habit and inattention rather than an 
acceptable deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of 
administering that penalty against its identifiable benefits, and rest 
in part on a faulty assumption about the retributive force of the 
death penalty.102 
Further, as noted above, the ALI abandoned its model statute for 
capital punishment in October 2009.103  In reaching this decision, the 
ALI Council overwhelmingly concluded “in light of the current 
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,”104 
a model death penalty should not be offered.  The ALI found that its 
model death penalty statute had “not withstood the tests of time and 
experience.”105  Among the concerns expressed by the ALI were the 
following: 
(a) the tension between clear statutory identification of which 
murders should command the death penalty and the constitutional 
requirement of individualized determination; (b) the difficulty of 
limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as 
they do in a number of state statutes now) a large percentage of 
murderers; (c) the near impossibility of addressing by legal rule the 
conscious or unconscious racial bias within the criminal-justice 
system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death sentences 
based on the race of the victim; (d) the enormous economic costs of 
administering a death-penalty regime, combined with studies 
showing that the legal representation provided to some criminal 
defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood, especially given the 
availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons 
sentenced to death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not 
have committed the crime for which they were sentenced; and (f) 
the politicization of judicial elections, where––even though nearly 
all state judges perform their tasks conscientiously––candidate 
 
102 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
103 AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 4 (2009); Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty 
Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353 (2010). 
104 AM. LAW INST., supra note 103, at annex B, at 1. 
105 Id. at 4. 
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statements of personal views on the death penalty and incumbent 
judges’ actions in death-penalty cases become campaign issues.106 
The ALI now rejects the very model that served as the basis for the 
constitutionally approved modern death penalty statutes.107 
Further, in 2002 and 2005, the Court restricted states’ prerogatives 
in structuring their capital sentencing regimes by forbidding the 
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders108 and 
juvenile offenders.109  By finding that there are classes of individuals 
who, as a group, are not sufficiently culpable for their actions to be 
subjected to death, the Court signaled that the Eighth Amendment 
confines the imposition of the death penalty and that states do not 
have unfettered discretion as to whom and when they may kill.  In 
significant part, the Court’s decision to exempt juveniles and mentally 
retarded offenders from the death penalty resulted from the fact that a 
significant number of states had legislatively prohibited the 
imposition of the death penalty on these two vulnerable groups.110  In 
Atkins and Roper, eighteen death penalty states and twelve non-death-
penalty states prohibited the death penalty against mentally retarded 
offenders and juvenile offenders.  When legislative death-penalty 
restrictions reach this critical mass, the Court has indicated that it will 
find sufficient evidence of a national consensus that the nation has 
turned its face on the use of the death penalty in this manner and that 
evolving standards of decency preclude the use of the death penalty 
under these circumstances.111 
Likewise, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,112 the Court held that a 
Louisiana statute that provided the death penalty for the crime of rape 
of a young child was unconstitutional.  In reaching its decision, the 
Court made clear that the death penalty is limited to the worst of the 
worst, the most egregious crimes and offenders.113  Accordingly, the 
 
106 Id. at 5. 
107 Id. at 3–4. 
108 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–21 (2002).  In 1989, the Court upheld the 
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated in part by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
109 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).  In 1989, the Court upheld the 
imposition of the death penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.  Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
110 Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
111 Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
112 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
113 Id. at 420. 
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Court found that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for 
ordinary crimes in which the victim is not murdered.114  Again, a 
substantial part of the Court’s evolving standards of decency analysis 
relied on state legislation and the fact that only six states had the 
penalty of death for child rape.115 
Although, in all of these cases, the Court asserts that ultimately its 
judgment on the excessiveness and/or proportionality of the 
punishment controls the constitutional standard, strong evidence 
exists suggesting that state legislative action may push the Court 
forward or backward in its Eighth Amendment analysis.116  Indeed, it 
appears that the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis depends, at least 
in part and maybe in critical part, on what state legislatures do.117 
IV 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In a departure from the early enthusiasm for post-Gregg death 
sentences, over the last decade, states have questioned and examined 
their death penalty statutes.  For example, some states, including 
California,118 Connecticut,119 Illinois,120 Indiana,121 and New 
Jersey,122 created commissions to study the fairness, efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and appropriateness of the death penalty.  Certain 
consistent concerns or themes emerge in these reports, including the 
high economic cost of capital punishment, the quality of defense 
counsel, the potential racial disparity in the capital sentencing 
process, and the danger of executing an innocent person.  Kansas, 
which reinstated the death penalty in 1994, issued a post-audit report 
 
114 Id. at 421. 
115 Id. at 422–26. 
116 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
117 See generally Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
118 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA (2008). 
119 STATE OF CONN. COMM’N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC 
ACT NO. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT (2003). 
120 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S 
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002). 
121 IND. CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMM’N, THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA’S CAPITAL 
SENTENCING LAW: FINDINGS OF THE INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION 
(2002). 
122 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY 
COMMISSION REPORT (2007). 
ENTZEROTH 3/19/2012  1:59 PM 
2012] The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American 817 
Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century 
in late 2003 concluding that the capital cases cost approximately 
seventy percent more than noncapital cases.123  States have reacted to 
reports about the failures of the death penalty by legislative 
limitations, judicial and executive decisions not to act on death 
penalty statutes, and legislative abolition. 
Some states implemented statutory changes to deal with the 
fairness and efficacy problems of capital punishment.  For example, 
North Carolina implemented the Racial Justice Act, which provides a 
greater opportunity for an offender to raise challenges based on racial 
bias in capital prosecutions.124  Maryland dramatically restricted the 
death penalty and placed higher evidentiary burdens in cases where 
the state seeks death.125 
Likewise, judges have expressed misgivings about the death 
penalty.  For example, Judge Boyce Martin of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated, 
Now in my thirtieth year as a judge on this Court, I have had an 
inside view of our system of capital punishment almost since the 
death penalty was reintroduced in the wake of Furman v. Georgia.  
During that time, judges, lawyers, and elected officials have 
expended great time and resources attempting to ensure the fairness, 
proportionality, and accuracy that the Constitution demands of our 
system.  But those efforts have utterly failed.  Capital punishment in 
this country remains “arbitrary, biased, and so fundamentally 
flawed at its very core that it is beyond repair.”  At the same time, 
the system’s necessary emphasis on competent representation, 
 
123 LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST AUDIT, STATE OF KAN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: 
COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS 10–19 (2003).  Studies and audits of other states’ capital punishment 
systems confirm that the cost of a capital trial and appeals greatly exceeds costs incurred in 
noncapital trials.  See PHILIP COOK & DONNA SLAWSON, TERRY SANFORD INST. OF PUB. 
POLICY DUKE UNIV., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA 
(1993); JOHN G. MORGAN, STATE OF TENN., TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES (2004); JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUDICIAL POLICY CTR., THE 
COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND (2008). 
124 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 (2009); Seth Kotch & Robert P. 
Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty 
in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031 (2010).  In late 2011, the North Carolina 
legislature voted to repeal the Racial Justice Act, but North Carolina Governor Bev 
Perdue, a death penalty supporter, vetoed the repeal effort stating, “[I]t is simply 
unacceptable for racial prejudice to play a role in the imposition of the death penalty in 
North Carolina.”  Gary D. Robertson, Beverly Perdue, North Carolina Governor, Vetoes 
Repeal of Racial Justice Act, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/14/racial-justice-act-bev-perdue-death-penalty-north             
-carolina_n_1148776.html. 
125 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (West 2009). 
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sound trial procedure, and searching post-conviction review has 
made it exceedingly expensive to maintain.126 
In September 2011, Chief Justice O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme 
Court convened a committee to review that state’s death penalty, 
although the purpose of the committee is not to debate whether Ohio 
should retain capital punishment.127 
The New York Court of Appeals found that the New York death 
penalty statute, which New York enacted in 1995, included a jury 
deadlock instruction that violated article I, section 6 of New York’s 
state constitution.128  In particular, the New York Court of Appeals 
concluded that the deadlock instruction might coerce jurors to impose 
a death sentence.129  Recognizing that the New York Constitution 
provided greater due process protection than the federal constitution 
and concluding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent offered less 
protection than due process deserved, the New York Court of Appeals 
struck down the deadlock instruction in the New York death penalty 
statute.130  Because the deadlock instruction was a critical part of the 
New York statute, this decision rendered the capital sentencing statute 
invalid unless and until the state legislature amended the statute to 
cure the defect.131  The New York legislature did not reinstate the 
death penalty.132 
On November 22, 2011, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber declared 
a moratorium on executions in that state through the duration of his 
term in office.133  Oregon reinstated the death penalty in 1984, and 
during his previous terms as governor from 1995 to 2003, Kitzhaber 
oversaw the only two modern executions carried out in the state.134  
Returning to the governor’s office for his third term, Governor 
 
126 Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2009) (Boyce, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
127 Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio’s Top Judge Calls for Death Penalty Review, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 8, 2011). 
128 People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). 
129 Id. at 356–59. 
130 Id. at 364–65. 
131 Id. at 365–67; see People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 970 (N.Y. 2007). 
132 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 103, at 363; Michael Powell, In N.Y., Lawmakers Vote 
Not to Reinstate Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A3. 
133 Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve––Calls 
for Action on Capital Punishment (2011), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org 
/gov-john-kitzhaber-oregon-declares-moratorium-all-executions. 
134 Id.; William Yardley, Oregon Governor Says He Will Block Executions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at A14. 
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Kitzhaber, a Democrat who is opposed to the death penalty, refused to 
oversee a third execution.135  In explaining his reasons for the 
moratorium, Governor Kitzhaber stated, 
Oregonians have a fundamental belief in fairness and justice––in 
swift and certain justice.  The death penalty as practiced in Oregon 
is neither fair nor just; and it is not swift or certain.  It is not applied 
equally to all.  It is a perversion of justice that the single best 
indicator of who will and will not be executed has nothing to do 
with the circumstances of a crime or the findings of a jury.  The 
only factor that determines whether someone sentenced to death in 
Oregon is actually executed is that they volunteer.  The hard truth is 
that in the 27 years since Oregonians reinstated the death penalty, it 
has only been carried out on two volunteers who waived their rights 
to appeal. 
In the years since those executions, many judges, district attorneys, 
legislators, death penalty proponents and opponents, and victims 
and their families have agreed that Oregon’s system is broken. 
But we have done nothing.  We have avoided the question. 
And during that time, a growing number of states have reconsidered 
their approach to capital punishment given public concern, evidence 
of wrongful convictions, the unequal application of the law, the 
expense of the process and other issues.136 
Governor Kitzhaber also set out more personal reasons for the 
moratorium: 
[The death penalty] has been carried out just twice in [the] last 49 
years in Oregon.  Both were during my first administration as 
Governor, one in 1996 and the other in 1997.  I allowed those 
sentences to be carried out despite my personal opposition to the 
death penalty.  I was torn between my personal convictions about 
the morality of capital punishment and my oath to uphold the 
Oregon constitution. 
They were the most agonizing and difficult decisions I have made 
as Governor and I have revisited and questioned them over and over 
again during the past 14 years.  I do not believe that those 
executions made us safer; and certainly they did not make us nobler 
as a society.  And I simply cannot participate once again in 
something I believe to be morally wrong.137 
 
135 Yardley, supra note 134. 
136 Press Release, supra note 133. 
137 Id. 
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Governor Kitzhaber called for the Oregon legislature to consider 
reforms to the death penalty and urged the people of Oregon to 
“engage in the long overdue debate” on the death penalty.138 
In the last four years, three state legislatures––New Mexico,139 
New Jersey,140 and Illinois141––have abolished the death penalty 
outright.  These legislative acts are a remarkable departure from the 
trend of the first thirty years after Gregg and may prove informative 
for the debates that are bound to arise in Oregon as well as in other 
states revisiting the death penalty.  In looking at the changes in 
legislative responses to the death penalty, it is worth considering the 
experiences of New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois.142 
A.  New Mexico Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment 
As noted earlier, in the years following Gregg, states and 
politicians eagerly embraced capital punishment, making it a 
prominent and seemingly intractable part of the criminal justice 
system.  New Mexico offers an interesting study of how this status 
changed and how the legislative process can result in abolition of the 
death penalty. 
Prior to Furman, the death penalty statute in New Mexico 
provided, 
When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony the judge 
shall sentence that person to death, unless the jury trying the case 
shall recommend life imprisonment, the judge shall sentence that 
person to life imprisonment; provided that in cases wherein the 
defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the commission of a capital 
felony, the court may in lieu of sentencing such person to death, 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.143 
Like other pre-Furman death penalty statutes, the New Mexico statute 
allowed the jury discretion to impose a sentence less than death, but 
did not provide criteria to guide the jury in this process.144  In 1969, 
 
138 Id. 
139 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (West 2009). 
140 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2007). 
141 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-1 (West 2011). 
142 For a discussion of the history of the death penalty in New Mexico, see Marcia J. 
Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 Through 
December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2008). 
143 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1963). 
144 See State v. Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 204–05 (N.M. 1969) (finding that the pre-Furman 
death penalty statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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perhaps reflecting the national anti-death-penalty trend of the years 
immediately preceding Furman, the New Mexico legislature limited 
the death penalty to the following offenses: 
Punishment by death for any crime is abolished except for the crime 
of killing a police officer or prison or jail guard while in the 
performance of his duties and except if the jury recommends the 
death penalty when the defendant commits a second capital felony 
after the time for due deliberation following the commission of a 
capital felony.145 
The same sentencing process of undirected jury discretion continued 
to apply to this more limited range of capital offenses.  Furman, 
however, rendered this death penalty system in New Mexico 
unconstitutional because the sentencing statute allowed juries 
unguided discretion in imposing a sentence less than death, which 
was the practice that Furman condemned.146 
Like some other states, New Mexico responded to Furman by 
creating a new death penalty statute that provided, “When a defendant 
has been convicted of a capital felony, he shall be punished by 
death.”147  New Mexico, thus, removed the jury’s sentencing 
discretion that rendered its previous statutes unconstitutional under 
Furman.  As noted earlier, however, in 1976, the Supreme Court in 
Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana concluded that 
such mandatory death penalty statutes violated the Eighth 
Amendment.148  In particular, the Court noted that “by the end of 
World War I, all but eight States, Hawaii, and the District of 
Columbia either had adopted discretionary death penalty schemes or 
abolished the death penalty altogether.  By 1963, all of these 
remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty 
statutes with discretionary jury sentencing.”149  The Court concluded 
that the pre-Furman legislative rejection of mandatory death penalty 
statutes evidenced that states had found that mandatory death 
sentences were “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.”150  Although 
 
145 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1963) (repealed 1973).  Section 40A-29-2.3 further 
provided that “[a]ny person currently under the penalty of death shall have such penalty 
revoked, a penalty of life imprisonment substituted.”  See Pace, 456 P.2d at 205 (applying 
the statute retroactively to a case pending on direct appeal). 
146 See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
147 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1973). 
148 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
149 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
150 Id. at 293. 
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the Court recognized that some states had enacted mandatory death 
penalty statutes in the wake of Furman, it nonetheless found that such 
statutes ran afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.151  
This determination rendered the New Mexico’s first post-Furman 
statute invalid. 
The New Mexico legislature responded to Woodson by crafting a 
statute that captured the elements that the Court sanctioned in Gregg 
v. Georgia.  Specifically, section 31-18-14 of the New Mexico Code 
provided, 
When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony, he shall 
be punished by life imprisonment or death.  The punishment shall 
be imposed after a sentencing hearing separate from the trial or 
guilty plea proceeding.  However, if the defendant has not reached 
the age of majority at the time of the commission of the capital 
felony for which he was convicted, he may be sentenced to life 
imprisonment but shall not be punished by death.152 
Capital felonies were broader than the death-eligible felonies 
specified by the legislature in 1969.153  In the post-Gregg system, 
capital felonies were no longer as limited as they were pre-Furman, 
but rather section 30-2-1 provided, 
A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by 
another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means 
with which death may be caused: 
(1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; 
(2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or 
(3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a 
depraved mind regardless of human life. 
Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital 
felony. 
Thus, more offenders were eligible for a death sentence under the 
post-Gregg statutes than were eligible for the death sentence in the 
years immediately preceding Furman. 
Nonetheless, while New Mexico adopted new and even broader 
death penalty statutes after Furman and Gregg, New Mexico did not 
 
151 Id. at 305. 
152 The New Mexico Legislature repealed section 31-18-14 in 2009 replacing it with the 
following language: “When a defendant has been convicted of a capital felony, the 
defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or life imprisonment without possibility 
of release or parole.” 
153 See supra notes 143–45. 
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display the unbridled enthusiasm for the death penalty that could be 
found in other states such as Texas or Arizona.  For example, New 
Mexico was one of the first states to forbid the execution of juvenile 
offenders.154  In addition to its early decision to create this categorical 
limitation on the death penalty, New Mexico never accumulated a 
large death row population.155  From 1997 to 2007, New Mexico 
sentenced fifteen men to death156 and executed only one condemned 
prisoner, Terry Clark.157  Evidently, Clark instructed his lawyers to 
drop his appeal and allow the state to execute him.158  By contrast, 
since reinstating the death penalty after Furman, neighboring state 
Arizona has executed twenty-eight people and currently has 134 
condemned prisoners on death row;159 Texas has executed 477 people 
and currently has 321 individuals on death row.160 
Another example of New Mexico’s ambivalence about the death 
penalty occurred in 1986 when Governor Toney Anaya commuted the 
death sentences of all five condemned prisoners who occupied New 
Mexico’s death row at that time.161  Governor Anaya opposed capital 
punishment and stated his position prior to his election.162  His 
position on the death penalty and its commutations starkly contrasts 
the position of most politicians, who readily embraced the death 
penalty in the 1980s.163  These commutations represent an executive 
abolition effort, at least with respect to those already sentenced to 
 
154 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NEW MEXICO: GENERAL INFORMATION, http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-mexico-1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
155 See Wilson, supra note 142, at 266. 
156 Id. 
157 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).  The 
condemned prisoner, Terry Clark, died by lethal injection in 2001.  Wilson, supra note 
142, at 271.  It was the first execution in New Mexico since 1960.  Id. 
158 See Wilson, supra note 142, at 271. 
159 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: ARIZONA, http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
160 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: TEXAS, http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
161 See Richard E. Meyer, Governor Calls Practice ‘Anti-God’: Anaya Spares All 
Inmates on New Mexico Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1986, at 1; Dave Maass, 
Former New Mexico Governor, Toney Anaya, Talks Death Penalty Politics, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 25, 2009, 5:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-maass/former-new  
-mexico-governo_b_298557.html. 
162 Maass, supra note 161. 
163 Id. 
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death, as opposed to abolition by the legislative or judicial branches 
of government.  Such executive commutations play another vital role 
in the evolution of the death penalty and the development of the 
Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency.164  The recent 
moratorium by Oregon Governor Kitzhaber may play a similar role in 
that state’s death penalty evolution. 
In 2009, New Mexico took the final step toward abolition.  With 
only two prisoners on death row,165 the New Mexico legislature 
passed a bill abolishing the death penalty.  On March 18, 2009, 
Governor Bill Richardson, a Democrat and death penalty 
supporter,166 signed the abolition bill into law.167  In signing the bill, 
Richardson stated, 
This has been the most difficult decision of my political career. . . .  
I do not have confidence in the criminal justice system as it 
currently operates to be the final arbiter when it comes to who lives 
and who dies for their crime. . . .  If the State is going to undertake 
this awesome responsibility, the system to impose this ultimate 
penalty must be perfect and can never be wrong.168 
The two prisoners on New Mexico’s death row at that time, however, 
did not receive a reprieve from their death sentences since the state 
 
164 A more recent and limited example of executive commutation occurred in Ohio.  On 
September 28, 2011, Ohio Governor John Kasich granted clemency to Joseph Murphy.  
This was Gov. Kasich’s second commutation since he took office in January 2011.  
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CLEMENCY: OHIO DEATH ROW INMATE GRANTED 
CLEMENCY, CITING ‘BRUTALLY ABUSIVE UPBRINGING,’ http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org 
/clemency-ohio-death-row-inmate-granted-clemency-citing-brutally-abusive-upbringing 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
165 STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO, supra note 157. 
166 Interestingly, Lieutenant Governor Diane D. Denish, a Democrat, supported the 
repeal of the death penalty, and she expressed her views to Governor Richardson.  Trip 
Jennings, Richardson Abolishes N.M. Death Penalty, N.M. INDEPENDENT, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://newmexicoindependent.com/22487/guv-abolishes-death-penalty-in-nm.  When the 
repeal process began during the legislative session, it at first appeared that Governor 
Richardson, a death penalty supporter, would be leaving the governor’s post for a position 
in the Obama Administration and that Denish, a death penalty opponent, would fill the 
post.  Richardson did not take a position in the Obama administration, however, and stayed 
on as New Mexico’s governor.  See Felicity Barringer, In Santa Fe, Staying Can Also Be 
Such Sweet Sorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A16; Brian Knowlton, Obama Names 
Richardson as Commerce Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/12/04/us/politics/04transition.html; Andy Barr, Bill Richardson Tarnished by 
Scandal, POLITICO, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18741 
.html. 
167 Jennings, supra note 166; Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2009, at A16. 
168 Id. 
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did not extend its change in the death penalty law retroactively to 
these individuals.169 
The abolition of the death penalty in New Mexico came about 
through the democratic process: a slow, arduous labor that engaged 
the efforts of many individuals.  Among the many people involved in 
the repeal process were Viki Elkey, who served as Executive Director 
of the New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty during this 
legislative effort,170 and State Representative Gail Chasey, a 
Democrat from Albuquerque, who first introduced a bill to abolish the 
death penalty in 1999.171 
The New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty began its 
abolition campaign in 1997 and underwent twelve years of successes 
and setbacks until its ultimate triumph in 2009.  Several themes 
resonated throughout this process and perhaps proved helpful in the 
Coalition’s ultimate success.172  First, the Coalition linked the needs 
of the murder victim’s family with the inadequacy of the death 
penalty system.  Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation 
supported the repeal of the death penalty, and surviving family 
members testified that the death penalty did not remedy or bring 
closure to their families.173  In this regard, the legislation tied the 
costs savings from abolishing the death penalty to services for 
families of victims.  Thus, rather than simply abandoning or 
neglecting the interests and needs of the murder victims and their 
families, the abolition efforts tied abolition to directly helping 
victims’ families.  In addition, the punishment of death was replaced 
with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which is a 
harsh punishment that prevents the offender from returning to society. 
 
169 See STATE BY STATE DATABASE: NEW MEXICO, supra note 157. 
170 Viki Elkey, Abolishing the Death Penalty in New Mexico: Lessons Learned in a 
Long Campaign, PEACEWORK, May 2009, available at http://www.peaceworkmagazine 
.org/abolishing-death-penalty-new-mexico-lessons-learned-long-campaign.  Elkey is a 
remarkable, spirited, vivacious woman who appears to have taken on her abolition task 
with utter determination and grit. 
171 N.M. LEGISLATURE, BILLS SPONSORED BY: GAIL CHASEY, 1999 REGULAR 
SESSION, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/legdetails.aspx?SPONCODE=HCHAS (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2012). 
172 Interview with Viki Elkey, Exec. Dir. of the N.M. Coal. to Repeal the Death Penalty 
(July 1, 2010). 
173 Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., New Mexico’s Legislature Votes to Abolish 
Death Penalty––Part of National Trend Away from Capital Punishment (Mar. 13, 2009). 
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Second, a powerful component of the abolition process revolved 
around the danger of executing an innocent person.  As Elkey 
explained, exonerated men and women changed the tone of debate 
with personal stories.174  The fear of New Mexico killing an innocent 
person and the face of those innocent individuals who barely escaped 
the executioner’s needle echoed throughout the death penalty 
debate.175  Among those telling stories of exoneration was Juan 
Melendez, who had been convicted and sentenced to die in Florida, 
and who spent eighteen years on death row before he was 
exonerated.176  Uneasiness over executing an innocent person has 
become an important topic in the debate over the legitimacy of the 
death penalty.177  As Justice Souter observed in his concurring 
opinion in Marsh v. Kansas, “Today, a new body of fact must be 
accounted for in deciding what, in practical terms, the Eighth 
Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989 
has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in 
numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests.”178 
The faith community also played a critical role in advocating 
abolition of the death penalty with officials from the Roman Catholic 
Church lobbying hard for repeal.179  Of note, Pope John Paul II issued 
encyclical “Evangelium Vitae” (The Gospel of Life) on March 25, 
1995, stating, 
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and 
extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided 
upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender 
except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would 
not be possible otherwise to defend society.  Today however, as a 
result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal 
system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.180 
 
174 Elkey, supra note 172. 
175 Id. 
176 Shari Allison & Cathy Ansheles, Taking Death off the Table in the Land of 
Enchantment, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 42. 
177 As noted in the Introduction, perhaps one of the most prominent recent examples of 
this problem was the execution of Troy Davis.  See, e.g., Editorial, A Grievous Wrong, 
N.Y. TIMES Sept. 20, 2011, at A30; Kim Severson, Georgia Execution to Proceed; Bids to 
Halt It Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A21. 
178 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207–08 (2006). 
179 Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, supra note 167. 
180 POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, EVANGELIUM VITAE (THE GOSPEL OF 
LIFE) ¶ 56 (1995). 
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The Catholic Church, as well as other religious denominations, 
presented moral pressure for abolition.181 
Third, cost proved a strong argument to abolish the death penalty.  
In the fiscal impact report prepared in connection with the New 
Mexico bill to abolish the death penalty, the Public Defender 
Department claimed that abolition would save millions of dollars.182  
The State Bar Task Force on the Administration of the Death Penalty 
also explained that the death penalty entails certain significant costs 
not found in noncapital cases.183  Elkey nonetheless advised that 
although cost was an important issue, it was not determinative.184 
Instead, the death penalty debate evoked a more emotional, moral, 
visceral decision-making process.  To that end, the religious 
component, particularly in a state like New Mexico with a strong 
Catholic community, and the very real risk of executing an innocent 
person proved critical.  Reflecting an evolving standard of decency, at 
least by New Mexico standards, the risk of executing someone who is 
innocent, particularly given the increasing evidence of this problem, 
makes the death penalty unsustainable. 
B.  New Jersey Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment 
Two years before the legislative abolition of the death penalty in 
New Mexico, the New Jersey legislature abolished the death penalty.  
New Jersey enacted its modern death penalty statute in 1982 and 
modeled the statute after the Model Penal Code although the 
legislature subsequently amended the statute a number of times.185  
During the modern death penalty era, sixty individuals were 
sentenced to death, fifty-two of those individuals had their sentences 
reversed by the courts, and no one was executed.186  The last 
execution in New Jersey took place in 1963.187 
The abolition efforts in New Jersey came about as a result of a few 
committed individuals, including Jack Callahan, Lorry W. Post, and 
 
181 Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, supra note 167. 
182 LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE, FISCAL 
IMPACT REPORT, H.B. 285, Regular Session, at 2 (2009). 
183 Id. 
184 Elkey, supra note 172. 
185 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 6, 8–10. 
186 Id. at 7. 
187 Id. at 5. 
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Celeste Fitzgerald as well as the dedicated work of several state 
legislators.188  New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium 
(NJDPM) spearheaded the lobbying effort, and its members, as well 
as other organizations such as the NAACP and Amnesty 
International, worked tirelessly to end the death penalty in New 
Jersey.189  In their lobbying and education efforts, these organizations 
often highlighted the risk of executing an innocent person and the 
failure of the death penalty to provide satisfaction to the victim’s 
family.190 
Among the first successes for NJDPM was the establishment of a 
commission to study the death penalty; the commission issued its 
findings in January 2007.191  In relevant part, the Commission 
concluded the following: the death penalty served no legitimate 
purpose, the death penalty was inconsistent with evolving standards 
of decency, the death penalty cost more than life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, a sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole adequately met public safety and 
penal interests, and funds should be made available to families of 
murder victims.192  The Commission then recommended that New 
Jersey abolish the death penalty and recommended that cost savings 
from abolition be used for services for surviving family members of 
murder victims.193 
After the issuance of the Commission report, the state legislature 
took up the charge during a lame duck session.194  Senators Raymond 
Lesniak and Robert Martin and House Speaker Joseph Roberts played 
critical roles in pushing the abolition legislation through the state 
legislature.  While the New Jerseyans for an Alternative to the Death 
Penalty and other organizations lobbied extensively for repeal, vocal 
opposition argued against it.195  The battle for repeal in the state 
 
188 See Robert J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in 
Modern History to Repeal Its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 497–98 
(2010) (providing a detailed and firsthand account of the repeal of capital punishment in 
New Jersey). 
189 Id. at 497–501. 
190 Id. at 502. 
191 Id. at 499; N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122. 
192 N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 21–65. 
193 Id. at 67. 
194 Martin, supra note 188, at 540. 
195 Id. at 526–27. 
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legislature was heated, contentious, and dramatic.196  Like in New 
Mexico, abolitionist arguments that proved effective included the risk 
of executing an innocent person, the cost savings achieved by 
abolishing the death penalty and replacing it with it with a sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole, and the benefits of tying the 
savings earned from abolishing capital punishment to services for 
family members of murder victims.197  In addition, given that New 
Jersey had not executed anyone since the early 1960s, some argued 
that sentencing individuals to death was a fraud since no one was 
executed after the state reinstated the death penalty in 1982.198  
Opposing repeal of the death penalty, several victims’ family 
members spoke passionately about the need to retain the death penalty 
to vindicate the victims’ deaths and argued for effective enforcement 
of the capital punishment statute rather than abandoning it.199 
Ultimately, the abolition legislation passed both houses, and 
Governor Corzine, an opponent of capital punishment,200 signed the 
bill into law at a public ceremony on December 17, 2007.201  In 
anticipation of the repeal, Governor Corzine commuted the sentences 
of the eight men who were on New Jersey’s death row.202  In signing 
the bill, Governor Corzine stated, “Today New Jersey is truly 
evolving. . . .  Society must determine if its endorsement of violence 
begets violence and undermines the sanctity of life. . . .  I answer yes, 
and therefore I believe we must evolve to ending that 
endorsement.”203 
 
196 Id. at 533–35. 
197 See id.; Keith B. Richburg, N.J. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to 
Sign, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2007, at A3. 
198 Martin, supra note 188, at 537. 
199 Richburg, supra note 197. 
200 Jeremy W. Peters, New Jersey Moves to End Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2007, at B1. 
201 Martin, supra note 188, at 537–38. 
202 Id. at 538. 
203 Deborah Howlett, Death Row Disappears as Corzine Signs Bill, STAR-LEDGER, 
Dec. 18, 2007, at 1.  Although there have been some efforts to reintroduce death penalty 
legislation in New Jersey, those efforts have not been met with much enthusiasm and to 
date have been unsuccessful.  See Erik Larsen, Death Penalty Debate Is Revived in N.J., 
NJ.COM, Apr. 2, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/nj_death_penalty 
_debate_is_rev.html. 
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C.  Illinois Legislative Abolition of Capital Punishment 
In the spring of 2011, Illinois became the third and most recent 
state to legislatively abolish capital punishment.204  Drama, 
corruption, and turmoil left an indelible mark on Illinois’s experience 
with the modern death penalty.205  Shortly after Furman, Illinois 
amended its death penalty statute, setting out factors that would 
render an offender eligible for death and also providing for a three-
judge panel to decide the sentence;206 the Illinois Supreme Court, 
however, struck down that statute as unconstitutional under both the 
state and federal constitutions.207  A new death penalty statute 
enacted in 1977 appeared to follow the model sanctioned by 
Gregg,208 although subsequent amendments to this statute broadened 
the crimes and criteria for death eligibility.209  Unlike New Mexico or 
even New Jersey, Illinois had a sizeable death row.  From 1977 to 
2011, Illinois sentenced 311 individuals to death.210  The state 
executed twelve individuals and exonerated at least twenty other 
condemned prisoners.211 
In early 2000, prompted by notorious cases of wrongful 
convictions and death sentences, Governor George Ryan declared a 
moratorium on executions and established a commission to study the 
death penalty in Illinois.212  The Commission released its report on 
April 15, 2002.  Although the Commission did not call for abolition 
of the death penalty, it did set out a number of recommendations 
 
204 John Schwartz & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital 
Punishment Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at A18. 
205 See Christina McMahon, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 PUB. INT. L. REP. 
83 (2011). 
206 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3. 
207 People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975); ILL. COMM’N ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120. 
208 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2011); ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3. 
209 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 2011); ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 3. 
210 McMahon, supra note 205, at 84; ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra 
note 120, at 5, 9 (indicating that when the Commission began its work, Illinois had 
sentenced more than 250 individuals to death although more than half of these reversed on 
appeal or subsequent review). 
211 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at 5. 
212 Id. at 1.  For an interesting and personal reflection on the Commission, see SCOTT 
TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTION ON DEALING WITH THE 
DEATH PENALTY (2003). 
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including the following: videotaping the questioning of capital 
suspects, reforms related to eyewitness identification, greatly limiting 
death eligibility, greater review of prosecutorial decisions to seek the 
death penalty, better training for capital lawyers, and requiring 
proportionality review by the state supreme court.213 
Even though the Commission did not recommend abolishing the 
death penalty, in 2003, Governor Ryan emptied the row by 
commuting the sentences of 167 death row inmates to life and 
pardoning four other condemned prisoners.214  Nonetheless, Illinois’s 
death penalty statute remained in effect after Ryan’s massive 
commutation.  After 2003, fifteen more capital offenders  were 
condemned to death,215 although the state did not kill any of these 
individuals.216  In 2011, the Illinois Coalition to Abolish the Death 
Penalty, as well as a number of other organizations, successfully 
concluded a two-year legislative campaign to abolish the death 
penalty in Illinois.217  The debate in the state house and senate was 
passionate and contentious on both sides.218  Supporters of the repeal 
raised passionate concerns about wrongful convictions and argued 
persuasively the very real specter of executing an innocent person.219  
This concern proved compelling in Illinois, where there were a 
significant number of well-publicized cases of exonerations.220  
Those favoring retention of the death penalty argued that it should be 
available for the worst of the worst and to provide retribution for 
victims and their families.221  Like in New Mexico and New Jersey, 
the savings from abolishing death row were to go, in part, to services 
 
213 ILL. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 120, at i–ii. 
214 Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204. 
215 Id. 
216 See ILLINOIS COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.icadp.org 
/legislative-action (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
217 Id. 
218 Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204. 
219 Steve Mills, What Killed Illinois’ Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2011, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-10/news/ct-met-illinois-death-penalty-history 
20110309_1_death-penalty-death-row-death-sentences; Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra 
note 204; Todd Wilson & Ray Long, Illinois Death Penalty Ban Sent to Gov. Pat Quinn, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2011, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2011/01/illinois   
-death-penalty-ban-a-step-closer-to-governors-desk.html. 
220 Mills, supra note 219; Schwartz & Fitzsimmons, supra note 204; Wilson & Long, 
supra note 219. 
221 Wilson & Long, supra note 219. 
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for surviving members of the victim’s family.222  In the end, the bill 
passed both houses, and Governor Quinn, a Democrat and death 
penalty supporter, signed the bill abolishing the death penalty in 
Illinois.223  Quinn also commuted the sentences of the remaining 
condemned prisoners on Illinois’s death row.224  In signing the 
legislation, Governor Quinn stated, 
We cannot have a death penalty system in our state that kills 
innocent people. . . .  Unfortunately that system was in grave danger 
of doing exactly that in 20 different instances in Illinois.  And so 
what’s really in question is the system itself.  If the system can’t be 
guaranteed 100 percent error-free, then we shouldn’t have the 
system.  It cannot stand.  It just is not right in our democracy and 
system of justice.225 
Sixteen states have abolished the death penalty; four of these 
sixteen states ended the death penalty in the last few years.  This 
abolition effort stands in marked contrast to the first thirty years of the 
modern death penalty.  Of course, this abolition effort did not occur 
overnight, but rather was part of an ongoing effort by a number of 
different individuals, organizations, and legislators who, for a variety 
of reasons, wanted to end capital punishment in their state.  The 
efforts of New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois provide useful 
guidance as to why this change occurred and what that change means 
for the American death penalty system. 
 
222 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-1(b) (West 2011) (“All unobligated and 
unexpended moneys remaining in the Capital Litigation Trust Fund on the effective date of 
this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly shall be transferred into the Death 
Penalty Abolition Fund, a special fund in the State treasury, to be expended by the Illinois 
Criminal Justice Information Authority, for services for families of victims of homicide or 
murder and for training of law enforcement personnel.”); see Mary Massingale, House 
Narrowly Approves Abolition of Death Penalty, ILL. STATEHOUSE NEWS, Jan. 6, 2011, 
http://illinois.statehousenewsonline.com/4846/house-narrowly-approves-abolition-of-death 
-penalty. 
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Penalty, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/4225981 
-418/gov.-pat-quinn-signs-bill-repealing-illinois-death-penalty; accord Patrick Yeagle, 
Illinois Death Penalty Repealed, ILL. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.illinoistimes.com 
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V 
END OF THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY 
In rejecting the death penalty, New Mexico, New Jersey, and 
Illinois found that the standards of decency of their states cannot 
abide the risk of the state killing an innocent man or woman.  The 
danger of killing the wrong person is even more problematic in the 
modern death penalty system, which faces intractable problems, 
including lack of competent lawyers to represent capital offenders, 
high economic costs, and the politicization of the judicial process.  
Further, and on a more fundamental level, the modern death penalty 
sets up a system that requires juries to do two incompatible tasks: (1) 
give a rational, reasoned determination of whether the defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) use discretion to spare the life of 
an offender if warranted.  As Justice Blackmun recognized, these 
goals are inconsistent, incompatible, and ultimately unworkable.226  
But more than that, the death penalty asks the jury to always get it 
right.  That is, convict the right man or woman and assure that a death 
sentence is proper in each particular case.  As the governors in New 
Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois indicated when they signed the 
repeal legislation into law, this task is not one that the modern death 
penalty is capable of achieving. 
It is also interesting to note that the abolition efforts occurred after 
the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001.  One might think 
that the terrorist attacks, and the accompanying insecurity that the 
nation might feel about its safety would ramp up support for the death 
penalty.  Surveys show, however, that, while a majority of Americans 
support capital punishment, when offered the life without the 
possibility of parole as a sentencing option, the support for the death 
penalty drops.227  Increased attention on wrongful convictions, and 
the mounting number of wrongful convictions, adds further doubts 
about the reliability of the death penalty.  Indeed, politicians in three 
very different states, in different parts of the country, voted against 
the death penalty without political ramifications.  These actions 
indicate an important shift in the death penalty debate. 
 
226 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
227 Frank Mace, It’s Time to Kill the Death Penalty, HARV. POL. REV., Sept. 26, 2011, 
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Yet, this observation should not be overstated.  No state in the 
Deep South has abolished the death penalty, and as demonstrated 
recently in Texas and Georgia, these states have no qualms about 
carrying out executions.  At most, North Carolina has addressed some 
important death penalty issues in enacting the Racial Justice Act, and 
Maryland has tightened the evidentiary standards in death penalty 
cases.  Until there is a successful abolition of the death penalty in the 
states in the Old Confederacy, however, the death penalty will remain 
an entrenched part of the American landscape. 
The danger of executing an innocent man or woman loomed large 
in the recent abolition debates.  The importance and prominence of 
this concern has increased dramatically in the last ten to fifteen years 
as DNA and other evidence have resulted in the exoneration of more 
than 130 condemned prisoners.  Illinois, in particular, faced the 
daunting reality that the State sent as many as twenty innocent men to 
death row.  In New Mexico, the testimony of Juan Melendez had a 
significant impact on the debate.  The conversation about the death 
penalty now poses the very real question of whether we as a society 
can live with killing innocent people as part of our death penalty 
ritual. 
Related to this concern is the option of sentencing someone to life 
without the possibility of parole.  In all three states that recently 
abolished the death penalty, it was replaced with a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole.  This sentencing option provides an 
alternative that assures public safety by keeping the offender out of 
society until the end of his or her life. 
Another issue of significance in the abolition efforts is the high 
economic cost of the death penalty.  In New Jersey this issue played a 
compelling role, particularly given that the state had not executed 
anyone who had been sentenced to death in the modern era.  The 
legislature found it important that the cost did not deliver the intended 
punishment––an execution.  Moreover, in all three states the savings, 
or at least part of the savings, derived from the death penalty were to 
be tied to services for the surviving victim’s family.  This factor may 
have been critical.  One of the main arguments for continuing the 
death penalty is to vindicate the loss of the victim to society and to his 
or her family.  It is important not to forget that the crime at issue in 
these cases is murder––frequently a senseless, horrible murder––and a 
number of individuals suffer as a result of that murder.  The 
emotional tug for those supporting the death penalty is the appeal of 
vindication or closure for the surviving members of the victim’s 
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family.  The successful abolition lobbying efforts also focused on the 
victim’s family and the failures of the death penalty system to meet 
the needs of these individuals who are truly aggrieved by the 
defendant’s actions. 
In signing the law repealing New Jersey’s death penalty statute, 
Governor Corzine stated that New Jersey was evolving.  To what 
extent then do the recent legislative abolition actions affect the 
evolution of the standards of decency that frame the Eighth 
Amendment?  In Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy the Court sought a 
national consensus that states have rejected a particular punishment as 
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.  The actions in New 
York, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Illinois to some extent indicate 
that at least some states have found that the death penalty is 
inconsistent with their state’s standards of decency.  Yet thirty-four 
states still have the death penalty, which is only one fewer than the 
number of states that revised their death penalty statutes after 
Furman.  The number of total abolition states is not yet comparable to 
the numbers the Court found persuasive in Atkins and Roper when the 
Court found that the imposition of the death penalty on mentally 
retarded and juvenile offenders violated evolving standards of 
decency.  It is unlikely, then, that at this point of time, the Supreme 
Court would find that the evolving standards of the Eighth 
Amendment preclude the death penalty. 
The struggle for abolition has turned a corner, but a long road lies 
ahead.  The next stage of the death penalty debate will be fought in 
the state legislatures.  If the three recent abolition states are any guide, 
this fight will be contentious and emotional.  It will also shape the 
course of capital punishment in the United States in the twenty-first 
century. 
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